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Introduction: On Democracy

Withthe deepening of the struggle ... only the workers and the peasants
will go all the way.
-Augusto Cesar Sandino!
Do not be frightened into their surrender by the alarms of the timid, or
the croakings of wealth against the ascendancy of the people.
-Thomas Jefferson2
When it took power in July 1979, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua
did not have any well-developed theory of Marxist democracy on which
to draw. Nor did it have fully democratic Marxist models on which to base
its praxis or on which it could rely for support, sustenance, and encouragement to develop its own democratic Marxism. There were few real-world
examples and little support from actual nation states to develop a democratic form of socialism, and even fewer to do so within the specific historic
conditions in Nicaragua.' The absence of these factors made the construction of such a democratic socialism difficult. It also retarded the development of sufficient
confidence to sustain
truly unique democratic
institutions in the face of increasing external pressure from the United
States and decreasing support from the Eastern European countries.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union thought their respective
model was the best for the Nicaraguans. Even though the Soviets were
more subtle, both superpowers were to some degree uncomfortable with
a uniquely Nicaraguan road to development
and democracy that would
break radically from the Eastern and Western models. Ironically, each side
believed that developments in Nicaragua were wholly inadequate
and
indicative of either dominance by Western influences (from the perspective of the socialist East) or communism (from the perspective of the
capitalist West). The socialist states were, however, clearly more willing
to support Nicaragua because the ideology was nominally Marxist (even
1
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though the economic and political systems were very different from thos,e
in Eastern Europe). The socialist states also realized that Nicaragua s
newly found independent, nonaligned stance threatened the tradltlOn~1
hegemony that the United States had exercised m the Canbbean Basin,
The popular insurrection that swept the Sandinistas to power lD 1979
initially endowed the emerging political system with a strong participatory
dimension. It did not, however, coincide well with either Western representative democracy or Eastern bureaucratic

socialism, since both of these

systems had either diminished or never adequately evolved mechanisms
to insure or facilitate direct, ongoing participation by the people.
The Marxist tradition is more diverse than the now-failed socialist
states in Eastern Europe would suggest. As with Jeffersonian democracy,
theoretical Marxism allows for real or direct democracy as well as nonparticipatory forms of governance that claim to be participatory. The first
relies more heavily on innovative theoretical interpretations, while the
second is based on Leninist conceptualizations of the party and actual
socialist practice.
Before Stalinism poisoned the international socialist movement,
Marxism was not a fixed dogma; it was a means of understanding
events
and a theoretical guide for developing all aspects of socialism.' Among
these were ways of assuring that democracy developed under socialism
(see Megill 1970, p. 54). In his now widely quoted essay, "What is Orthodox Marxism?" (originally published in the early 1920s), Georg Lukacs
(1971,p. 1) argues that Marxism "does not imply the uncritical acceptance
of the results of Marx's investigations. It is not the 'belief in this or that
thesis,not the exegesisofa 'sacred' book. On the contrary, orthodox refers
exclusively to method. "
Thus Marxism can and should be developed in light of new and
different conditions. The Russian Marxist dissident Roy Medvedev (1975,
p. xx) argues that "Marxism, in my view, is not some kind of dogma but a
science that should be developed and enriched by new ideas and theories,
while propositions that prove to be obsolete, one-sided, or even wrong
must be discarded." And as to democracy, he is even more specific: "It is
absolutely not true that Marxism and socialism are incompatible with
democracy." He does note that "the works of neither Marx and Engels
nor Lenin adequately deal with the complex problems involved [with
democracy]" (ibid.), and calls for the development of democratic Marxist
theory to fill tr:'isgap. Lamentably, this task has not yet been accomplished.
As Marxists like Lukacs strove to assert their independence and
develop democrati~ th~ory and practice in Hungary in 1956 (Lukacs was
rmmster of education lD the short-lived Nagy government and was impnsone~ a~d exiled for his involvement), they were brutally crushed by
the Soviet Juggernaut that had been fashioned by Joseph Stalin. Even
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more to the point, the vibrant, experimental, and very democratic Marxism(socialism with a human face) that was led by Alexander Dubcek in
the Prague Spring of 1968 was also crushed by Soviet tanks before any of
the theoretical or practical problems of democratizing Marxism could be
resolved.A similar fate seems to have met many others who attempted to
democratizeMarxist theory or practice. For instance, when Rudolf Bahro
(1978,esp. part 3) wrote his now famous work Die Alternative in 1<n7 and
calledfor an emancipatory alternative to the bureaucratic socialism that
had developed in Eastern Europe, he was first forced from the party in
the German Democratic Republic and then forced into exile. The generally negative reception that such calls for a democratic, participatory
alternative in Eastern Europe received made it difficult for creative
Marxistthinkers everywhere and further retarded the development of
democraticMarxist theory.
Noform of democracy has been easy to achieve in the Latin American
context.Although most Latin American nations have been republics for
some170years (Brazil was an empire until 1889 and Cuba did not gain its
independence until 1902), few have been able to achieve any consistent
democracyand many have been influenced as much by outside forces as
bythe willof their own people. Nicaragua, for instance, experienced long
periodsof dictatorial rule, the frequent intervention of the Marines, and
theseizureof power in the 1850sby a Yankee mercenary, William Walker,
who declared himself president and designated English as the official
language.Like most of Latin America, its history, institutions, and political culture were heavily imbued with authoritarianism and often influencedby some of the least democratic aspects of its large neighbor to the
North.
If the first, nineteenth-century (bourgeois democratic) revolutions
didnot firmly root nominal Western democracy in all of Latin America,
many hoped that the second (socialist) revolutions would break the
authoritarian tradition and interject vibrant forms of people's democracy
intothe political milieu. Indeed, Fidel Castro and CM Guevara dreamt of
a continental revolution that would forge free and independent socialist
republicsin which the people could rule their destinies. But their dream
has been difficult to realize. First, other socialist revolutions were not
inunediately triumphant. Second, as Cuba gained more autonomy and
freedom as an independent nation, the constant economic and political
pressurefrom the United States combined with other factors to prevent
it fromtranscending its authoritarian political culture or setting aside the
antidemocratic influences from Eastern Europe. Cuba did not begin to
holdelections or provide other forms of democratic participation for more
than a decade after the revolutionary triumph. Reforms in the mid-1970s
did, however, institutionalize regularized local elections and initiate a
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series of new structures and procedures (popular power in particular) that
facilitated greater participation and decisionmaking power for the Cuban
masses, though mostly at the lower level (see Harnecker 1980). These
reforms and the participation they engendered represent~d
a ne,,: and
different attempt to keep alive the democratic Ideal ill Latin America-sthis time in a state that was well along the path of socialist construction.
Michael Lowy (1986, p. 270) observed that "popular power in Cuba
represents a real democratic advance in the transitron to socialism and an
example that should be carefully studied." But like its Eastern European
counterparts, Cuba was still struggling with authoritarian
and bureaucratic party rule. Nor did the constant pressure from the United States
diminish the perceived need for an authoritarian state. The popular power
movement did interject an element of democracy at the local level.
Decisionmaking at the national level, however, was still far removed from
direct control by the people. No national leaders were elected directly by
the people or by their mass organizations.
This reality and the growing bureaucratization of Cuban society led
many to wonder if the construction of socialist states in Latin America
would actually enhance the practice of democracy. The triumph of progressive forces in Chile in 1970suggested that even more traditional forms
of Western-style democracy might allow some Latin American nations
with more firmly established democratic political cultures and institutions
to use these to construct socialism and stimulate even greater participation
by the popular masses. The flowering of democracy and socialism during
the Allende years proved inspirational for many Latin Americans. In the
eyes of many, Chile even began to serve as a model of democratic socialism
in Latin America. However, the bloody 1973 coup and the Pinochet
dictatorship that followed suggested that Western democracy and socialism might not be compatible at all and that more authoritarian
measures
might be necessary to ensure the continuation of socialism and even the
possibility of more expansive democracy at a later time.
The triumph of the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua in July 1979
estab.li~hed a state .that valued its freedom and independence highly. The
Sandinista revolution was clearly under the hegemony of a Marxist vanguard. party, but it was also dedicated to the democratic incorporation of
the NIcaraguan people and-because
ofthe broad-based multiclass composition of the coalition of forces that toppled Anastasio Somoza-to
democ~atic pluralism. Although buffeted by the residual effects of the
revolution agamst Somoza and the increasing hostility of the United States
after 1981, there was (in varying degrees) a commitment to building both
democracy and socialism in the new state.
~e case of Nicaragua thus posed an important question: can a Latin
Amencan--or Third World-nation,
struggling to achieve a larger degree
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of freedom and independence, sustain relatively high degrees of both
democracy and socialism? And more specifically, can democracy exist
within a state that is based on a nationalist variant of Third World
Marxism?Even some writers who are sympathetic to the socialist enterprise are ready to acknowledge the difficulty of achieving democracy in
this context. Orlando Nunez Soto and Roger Burbach (1986,p.106) admit
that the "majority of socialist countries ... have not been ideal political
or cultural democracies." They note that such regimes have been plagued
byauthoritarianism, vertical bureaucratic tendencies, and elitist behavior
(ibid.).Recently, even some Soviet writers--enlivened no doubt by perestroika-suggested that the reason Joseph Stalin was able to impose an
absolute authoritarianism on the Soviet nation so easily was that the
originalBolshevik Party contained centralized tendencies that facilitated
this process (see Keller 1988). One writer went so far as to suggest that
"the sternest indictment of state socialism is its stifling of grass-roots
initiative" (ibid.). Writing from a critical perspective, Medvedev (1981,
esp.chap.2) suggested that suchtendencies may even be inherent in some,
thoughnot all, of Lenin's thought. Further, and perhaps more precisely,
the initialvariant of Latin American Marxism that was championed by the
Comintem and eventually adopted by virtually all the orthodox Marxist
parties in Latin America was that of a rather traditional Soviet authoritarianconception of socialism that left little room for democratic initiative
ofanykind (see NACLA 1987,Caballero 1987, Vanden 1986). It emphasizedthe centralization of power and the key and unchallenged role of the
vanguardparty. The advocates of this position were hesitant to concede
toomuchpower to the people themselves and were thusless than trusting
of peasant-led revolutionary movements or populism generally (see
Vanden1986, Hodges 1986).
InLatin America there were a few early Marxist innovators like Jose
CarlosMariategui (Peru, 1894-1930),but they had not been successful in
breaking away the Latin American Marxist movement from Sovietcentric(if not Stalin-dominated) dogmatic authoritarianism. Half a centurylater Carlos Fonseca Amador and the other Sandinista leaders were
finallyable to enjoy a great deal more success in a verydifferent historical
period.Formulating theory and praxis in a small peripheral society in the
19608,19708,and 1980s, a second generation of Sandinista leaders broke
withthis past (and the orthodox Nicaraguan SocialistParty) to develop a
differentkind of Marxism-c-one that was much less constrained and could
takefulladvantage not only ofpolycentrism and Eurocommunism, but of
the democratic, participatory dimension of the New Left in the West, the
experiment with socialist democracy in Chile, and the popular power
movement in Cuba. The historic reality in which the construction of
socialismin Nicaragua occurred was thus radically different from that of
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other Third World nations.
Unlike the stolid, bureaucratized state socialism that Stalin and his
followers had developed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, that
which was developing in Nicaragua was much more in touch with the
democratic, popular dimension of Marxism. As such, it offered many new
possibilities. Founding Sandinista N ationa! Liberation Front (FSLN)
members Carlos Fonseca Amador and Tomas Borge had brief, problematic associations with the pro-Soviet, Nicaraguan Socialist Party but had
not stayed with the party because they believed its (Stalinist) version of
Marxism was not a viahle example of how Marxism should be developed
in Nicaragua. When Borge was exiled in Peru, Fonseca Amador told him
to seek out Esteban Pavletich. The Peruvian had served as Augusto cesar
Sandino's secretary and had been the primary link between Sandino's
struggle and the iconoclastic group of Peruvian Marxist-Leninists led hy
Mariategui. In talking with Pavletich about Mariategui, Borge was utilizing one of the few sources of authentic Latin Marxism and symbolically
laying the groundwork for the development of a non-Stalirrist Marxism in
Nicaragua. Indeed, Borge's view of Mariategui (who was eventually condemned by the Sovietsin the 1930s) was that "he was the most important
Marxist that Latin America produced." Conversely, he was openly critical
of other Latin American Marxists who had dogmatically followed the
Soviet line." The Sandinistas hoped to break with the old authoritarian
Marxism that had dominated the movement in and outside of Latin
America. To do so they realized that they must infuse their ideology and
politics with a strong dose of popular democracy. However, it was not
always easy to decide just which forms of democracy were optimal or
applicable.

Capitalist and Socialist Conceptions of Democracy
"Democracy"

derives from demos, the people, and kratos, the exercise of

power. In its original sense it means power of the people (Medvedev 1975
p. 31). American academic Samuel Huntington (1989, p. 12) suggests tha;
"democracy ~an be defined in terms of who rules, for what ends and by
what means. In Its most radical sense, It IS, as Abraham Lincoln said, a
government of the people, and by the people, and for the people. Unlike
other types of go.vemment,it claims to allow the people themselves to rule,
to make the decisions that govern their lives, and "all reasonable people,
when they speak of democracy, mean a system in which collective deciSIO~S,i.e., the decisionswhich affect the whole community
are taken by
all mterested parties" (Bobbio 1976, p. 111).They are to de~ide their own
destmy through their participation in the political process.
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Although democracy in the abstract has few detractors, there is no
unanimityof opinion on exactly which forms of political participation are
essentialfor democracy or precisely which political institutions best allow
the demosto have a say in the governmental process. Richard Fagen (1986,
p. 258)believes that there must be effective participation by individuals
and groups in the decisions that most affect their lives, a system of
accountability such that leaders and officials can be monitored and
changed if necessary, and political equality so that all have an equal
opportunityto participate in the political process.
Upon closer examination,

one finds not one, but several visions of

democracy.' These include representative democracy as practiced in
Western nations, people's democracy as practiced in many MarxistLeninist states, and direct or participatory democracy as practiced by
youngstudents and workers in Paris in 1968 and by the people of Prague
in the springof 1968. There is also growing interest in grass-roots democracy,especially as manifest in the worker self-management and neighborhoodcontrol movements. But as different types of democracy proliferate,
agreementon what is essential to democracy is more difficult to achieve.
Thus,groups that hold one form particularly dear are often loath to admit
that other forms might also tap other dimensions of democracy.
InNorth America and Western Europe some have been very skepticalofthe kind or degree of democracy allowed by governmental structures
that are not identical to their own. Thus many believed that Nicaragua,
becauseit was guided by a party that considered itself socialist, could not
possiblyharbor democracy (see U.S. Dept. of State 1987).Socialists have
been equally critical of Western-style representative democracy. Lenin
(1971,pp.295-296), for instance, argued that the real essenceofbourgeois
parliamentarianism was "to decide once every few years which member
ofthe ruling class is to repress and crush the people through parliament."
Accordingly,he and many Marxists believed that elections and formal
parliamentary institutions did not guarantee democracy either. Rather,
theybelieved such formal institutions must be transformed into working
bodies-like Marx's original vision of the Paris Commune of 1871 or the
originallocal soviets in 1917-that allowed the people to have a direct say
in the making of policy (ibid., pp. 296-2r:n; see also Marx 1960, lr:n8).
As we examine what democracy means, it may be possible to find
somesimilarities in the ways in which democracy is conceived and practiced in socialist and capitalist states. Like John Locke, Marx did not like
govemmentand planted the idea-which Lenin developed-that the state
apparatus should disappear ("wither away" in Lenin's words). Like Jefferson,he saw government as a necessary evil to be endured only in a
transitional stage of socialism while the material bases of class differentiationwere eliminated. As the polity moved to a more advanced stage of
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socialism(communism) it would no longer be necessary to have a government and the people would rule directly. Indeed, he thought he saw the
seed; of such rule when he observed the popular assemblies in the Paris
Commune in 1871.
Both Marx and Jefferson trusted the people and thought that they
would rule wisely and justly under the right conditions. Neither thought
that rule should be far removed from the people, and both believed the
interests and opinion ofthe majority should be the final arbiter. Although
their modem-day discipleshave often found themselves in opposition,
Marxand Jefferson shared a similar view of human nature and democracy,
if not govemment as well.Like the French thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
both men saw an inherent goodness in all human beings. This led them to
place their faith in the people and their inherent ability to control their
affairs. They did not think that others should be forever ordained to
govern for them. Responding to Rousseau's introductory remarks in The
Social Contract, that while born free people are everywhere in chains,
Marx ends the Communist Manifesto with his now-famous observation
that the proletariat has a world to win and nothing to lose but its chains.
Nor did Jefferson-who thought rebellion every twenty years or so was
salutary to the body politic-believe that the freedom of the people should
be usurped by an elite.' As he put it shortly before he died in the surnmer
of 1826, "the light of science has already laid open to every view the
palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles
on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred ready to ride them
... " (in Padover 1956,p. 344).
Jefferson hated monarchy and aristocracy and believed in the people:
"Mymost earnest wishisto see the republican element of popular control
pushed to the maximum of its practicable exercise." Only then could
government be "pure and perpetual." The writer of the Declaration of
Independence thought government should be minimal and always under
the control of the people. Although he accepted representative government (as contrasted to direct rule by the people) as a necessity, because
he believed it was not possible to have direct government in entities that
were much larger than New England townships, he thought that such
gove.rningshould be by the citizens "acting directly and personally, accordmg to rules established by the majority." Further, the degree of rule
by the people should be judged in proportion to the "direct action of its
citizens," and the next best thing to pure democracy is where people in
branches of government "are chosen by the people more or less directly"
(in Padover 1939, p. 39).
. ~~ one po~t Jefferson went so far as to propose a ward system for
Virginia, wherein everyone could be "an acting member of the cornmon
government, transacting inperson a great portion of its rights and duties"
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(inLobel 1988,p. 824). In thattradition, many nineteenth-century Americanradicalsrejected the whole system of representative government and
arguedthat laws should be passed by referendum. They believed that the
populationshould participate directly in the governmental decisionmakingprocess(ibid.),
The origins of this pure view of democracy extend back through
Rousseau to classical Greece where it was assumed that all qualified
individualswould not only vote but would directly engage in government
through selection by lot or through voluntary participation. Initially,
however,the enfranchised demos was a very select group comprised of
men who were large landowners or had other means of wealth that
allowedthem the time to pursue the affairs of state (all women, slaves,
and those of lesser means were excluded). When democracy was reborn
and developed after the American Revolution, the categories and numbers of those so enfranchised were gradually widened. As European
systemswere reformed to include more political participants, the idea of
sometype of rule by the people gained legitimacy and wider acceptance.
Graduallyits forms (though not necessarily its radical essence) spread to
moredistantparts of Europe and Latin America in the nineteenth century.
Bythe second half of the twentieth century, the concept of participation
in electionsand other democratic enterprises by virtually all the citizens
waswidelyaccepted.
Classicalor orthodox theories of democracy are stronglypremised on
real popular participation in the governmental process. Commitment to
this theory of democracy therefore implies a belief in the desirability and
necessityof widespread popular participation. Likewise, the corollary is
thatlowlevels of political interest and participation result from inadequacies in the structures or opportunities for participation that exist in a
particularpolity and not from any inherent inadequacies in the people
themselves(see Osbun 1985, p. 29). Classical democratic thinkers like
Rousseau(as well as Jefferson) are therefore seen as theorists par excellenceofparticipation as an integral part of democracy. They also hold that
equalityand economic independence are the minimum conditions necessary for such democratic participation. For thinkers like Rousseau and
John Stuart Mill, "participation has far wider functions and is central to
the establishment and maintenance of the democratic polity" (Pateman
1970, p. 20).
This vision of democracy runs through American history and was
manifestin populist leaders like Andrew Jackson and in populist movements.It also can be seen in the widening of the voting franchise and in
the institutionalization of and recourse to initiative, referendum, and
recallthat blossomed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(see Goodwyn 1976, Salvatore 1982, Hahn 1983). In his work on direct
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democracy, Thomas Cronin (1989, pp. 19-20) finds that these reform
movements gradually opened up the American political system to all?w
more direct democracy and that such manifestations "have been a lasting
and generally positive part of the A,;"erican landscape" (p. 2). Recent
manifestations include the calls for direct democracy by students ill the
1960sand the current movements in favor of grass-roots, neighborhood,
and workplace democracy. Although not as prevalent as Jefferson might
have hoped, democracy based on widespread popular participation has
itsadvocates and supporters (see, for instance, Bachrach and Baratz 1962
and Bachrach 1967). It isstill practiced in the NewEngland town meetmg
and in isolated areas like the Swiss Canton of Apenzell, where the local
populace meet around an ancient tree once a year to decide what will be
done in the twelve months that follow (Woodstock 1971, pp. 12-13).'
But there is another strain of democracy that emerged in the West.
In the United States, the writers of The Federalist Papers did not think
that direct participation of the mass of the people in government was
alwayspossible or desirable. Rather they believed that the people should
be represented by those who understood the true needs of the republic
(those with wealth and/or position). James Madison did not even think
that representatives had to be tied directly to the interests of the electorate (Lobel 1988, pp. 828-829).
When arguing for strengthening the federal government, Alexander
Hamilton (The Federalist Papers, Federalist 35, 1952)is even more clear:
"The actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each
class,is altogether visionary." Hamilton further assumed a commonality
of interest between all those who labored in a particular sector of society
regardless of their particular wealth. To his way of thinking, the poorest
tenant and wealthiest landlord had a common interest (Lobel 1988, pp.
828-829). As suggested elsewhere in The Federalist Papers, there have
been those who did not think direct democracy wasnecessary and further
believed that chosen representatives (who might come from the wellheeled) could represent the interests of all. Democracy was thus equated
with representative government. And after 1787-1788, many held that
"democracy meant not government by and of the people, but simply
representative government" (ibid., p. 830).
On the other hand, there was considerable concern that the new
more centralized constitutional structure of the United States govern:
ment would remove power from the hands of the people. The Federalist
Papers were in large part written to calm such popular fears. The author
of F~deralist 57 (The Federalist Papers 1952, pp. 176-179) spends a
considerable amount of time answering the charge that the leadership of
this new government "willbe taken from that classof citizens which will
have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to

Introduction

11

aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the
few." Federalist 55 (The Federalist Papers 1952, p. 172) also attempts to
refute the charge that the House of Representatives "willbe taken from
the class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the
massesofthe people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation
of the fewon the depression of the many." John Adams wanted forms of
governmentthat stressed avoiding the excesses of pure or direct democracy(Cronin1989, p. 15). The constitutional structure provided the framework for a system of indirect democracy and minimized the tradition of
direct democracy that was as old as the English settlements in North
America(ibid., p. 1). Popular concerns about such exclusionary visions of
democracydid not, however, stop the constitutional structure from being
implementedin 1789. This set in motion an emphasis on indirect forms of
democracyand a deemphasis on popular participation. Overtime this has
evolvedinto a system where there is less and less popular participation.
In a current version of Hamilton's thinking, George Willargued that
the "people are not supposed to govern; they are not supposed to decide
issues.They are supposed to decide who will decide" (in ibid., p. 21). But
evenparticipation in elections (deciding who will decide) is declining. In
recent local elections in the United States, an average of fewer than 20
percentof those registered voted. In the presidential election of 1984, only
53 percent of the eligible voters participated. In the 1988 election the
figurewas reduced to 50 percent, meaning that some 26 percent of the
eligibleelectorate in the United States chose the president. Only 36
percentof the electorate voted in the 1990 midterm election. This evolutionhas prompted many writers 10 be critical of what is currently termed
democracyin the United States and to suggest that it is far from majoritarianrule (Parenti 1983).
In hisrecent article "America as a Model for the World? A Skeptical
View,"Ted Robert Gurr (1991,p. 665) notes that "empowered political
minoritiescan block concerted action" on major policy issues such as
medicalcare and social services for those in need. In America: What Went
Wrong? Donald Barlett and James B. Steele (1992, p. ix) note how the
concentration of wealth and power has derailed American democracy.
They observe that the "wage and salary structure of American business,
encouraged by federal tax policies, is pushing the nation toward a twoclasssociety.The top 4 percent make as much as the bottom half of U.S.
workers."Such trends at least suggest that some care should be taken in
holding up this form of democracy as a perfect model that should be
emulatedat all cost by developing nations like Nicaragua. Indeed Greider
(1992)finds that American democracy has been betrayed.
Revisions of classical democracy have found their theorists in more
modemtimes. In his well-known work Capitalism, Socialism and Democ-
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racy, Joseph Schumpter (1943, p. 283) ar~,ue.sthat the "ele".toral mass is
incapable of action other than stampede. Similarly, he believes participation no longer has a central role in t~e democratic process (see Pateman
1970,p. 5). Another revisionist theonst even suggested that Iimited participation and apathy have a positive function because they cushion the
shock of disagreement, adjustment, and change."
_
.
These writers were expressing unease with that manifestation of the
beliefs of the masses that Rousseau (1952, esp. book 2) termed the popular
will(yolonte populaire), which is sometimes equated with unreflective or
unenlightened public opinion. It is assumed that there IS also a general will
ivolonte general) that represents a (more enlightened and) more informed
common interest. "The general will alone can direct the State according
to the object for which it was instituted, i.e., the common good" (ibid., p.
395). And, "what makes the will general is less the number of votes than
the common interest among them" (ibid., p. 397). The democratic
revisionists believed that different forms of indirect, representative democracy could express the interest of the people (represent their general
interest) as well as or better than direct democracy. But there is more to
Rousseau's thinking. He stipulates that the will is only general if it is the
willof the entire body of the people, while it is not when it is only the will
of a part of it. And further, "there is often a great deal of difference
between the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the
common interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and

it is no more than a sum of particular wills ... " (ibid., p. 396). Thus many
of the democratic revisionists assume that a class of representatives may
be able to ascertain the general will for the people even though the
government itself may not precisely be of the people. That is, a group not
of the people can decide for the people.
The idea of a small group deciding for the many is not limited to
revisionist theorists of Western democracy. This concept has perhaps its
most perfect articulation in Lenin's conception of the vanguard party as
that entity that best understands the needs of the majority (the working
class in the modem, increasingly industrialized world) and is therefore
most competent to implement policy that benefits it. The theoretical
underpinning of the Leninist party is premised on the assumption that the
vanguard can know the general will of the people. With the revisionist
thinkers in the West, little attempt is made to distinguish between a
general ~ill that-no m~tter how hard to know-e-considers only the
common interest and a WIllof all that is no more than a sum of particular
wills (ibid.).
One
. is here reminded of the work of Robert Dahl , one of the most
prominent current revisionist theorists of democracy. Dahl (1956, p. 143)
found that as long as there are representatives of each group involved in
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the decisionmaking process in some (not necessarily effective) way, representative democracy is alive and well: "In American politics, as in all
other societies, control over decisions is unevenly distributed; neither
individuals nor groups are political equals. . . . Thus the making of
governmental decisions is not a majestic march of great majorities united
upon certain matters of basic policy. It is the steady appeasement of
relativelysmall groups" (ibid., p. 164). In Dahl's original conceptualization of democracy (polyarchy), the rule of multiple minorities was presented as a model of what works in the American political system (and
what is therefore desirable)." Under Dahl's system, all the people were
not involvedin the decisionmaking process, only some of their representativeswere consulted on some issues. This is a far cry from the classical
visionof democracy that sees all of the demos participating in the vital
decisionmakingprocesses of government. Yet this view has been widely
accepted as an accurate description of representative democracy in the
United States and (implicitly) as a model for democratic government. In
suchsystems,participation has no central role. All that is necessary is that
enough citizens participate to keep the electoral machinery working
(pateman 1970, p. 5).12
This commonly accepted view of democracy in the West is problematic.First, it contradicts the clear participatory dimension of democracy
found in classical Greece and in Rousseau's and Jefferson's writings;
second,it assumes that educating the masses for their central role in the
decisionmakingprocess is not necessary or important. Writers from Rousseau to John Dewey have underscored the importance of education,
informeddeliberation, and participation in the democratic process and
hold them essential to the effective functioning of democracy. L. Davis
(1964,pp. 40-41) underscores the importance of these processes and
arguesthat participation has an ambitious purpose:
the education of the entire people to the point where their intellectual,
emotional, and moral capabilities have reached their full potential and
they are joined freely and actively in a genuine community ....

Systemsthat do not achieve such education, popular deliberation, and
involvementdo not, we believe, realize their full potential and therefore
could be considered singularly ill-suited as models of democratic government. The bureaucratized socialism of Eastern Europe-though it did
provide education-afforded
little popular deliberation and less meaningfulparticipation. In the United States, there is much popular deliberation,but the quality of education often diminishes its effectiveness. Over
the past few decades, there has been less and less participation in most
fonns of governance, while economic and political power has become
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more and more concentrated. Gurr (1991, p. 666) has noted that
policymaking in the United States has not made for the most egabtanan
of societies:"
Between 1977and1988theafter-tax incomeofthe poorest fifth dropped
10%, of the nextpoorestfifth, it dropped 3%.At the othero end of the
scale the household income of the richest fifth increased 34 Yo. And for
the top one percent it increased 122%•

Barlett and Steele (1992,esp. chap. 9) suggest that the political process in
the United States is increasingly responding more to wealth and influence
than popular need or participation. According to federal statistics released
in early 1992, the top 1 percent of households in the United States had
greater net worth than the bottom 90 percent of households by 1989 (New
York Times 1992, p. 1).
In contrast to the concentration of wealth and influence and declining
participation in the United States, classical or full democracy considers
participation essential. Moreover, democracy that is participatory is
founded on two complementary notions: "that people are inherently
capable of understanding their problems and expressing themselves about
these problems and their solutions" and that "real solutions to problems
require the fullest participation of the people in these solutions, with the
development of freedom from dependency on authorities and experts"
(Oppenheimer 1971, p. 277). The idea is to create a polity in which
everyone will participate to the fullest in decisions that concern their
everyday or long-range affairs. The process of decisionmaking, therefore,
isas important as the actual irrunediate decision made.
Thus one is led to ask the more difficult questions of if and where
adequate models of full democracy exist. As he explored this question
alongthe way to the formulation of a new democratic theory, Megill (1970,
p. 44) observed that, in different ways, the liberal democrats in the West
and the Stalinists in Eastern Europe have each "diverted democracy from
its basic tradition of rule by the people." In the socialist countries, the
people have been replaced by the party, which isin tum controlled by the
party organization (ibid.). Leninist and therefore Communist views of
democracy flow from the model of the Marxist-Leninist Party that developed in Russia and the relation of the party to the society. This party was
successfulin seizing power,but it failed as an instrument for the thoroughgoing democratization of society, particularly as it developed under
Stalin's rule (ibid., p. 43).This is ironic because, from his earliest writings,
".Marxwas committed t? the idea of direct democracy. His early concepuon of such democ~acy mvolved a Rousseauesque critique of the principles of representation ... " and he held the view that "true democracy
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involves the disappearance
of the state and thus the separation of the state
from civil society" (Bottomore
et al. 1983, p. 114).
Marx was greatly inspired by the Paris Commune of 1871, which took
the management of the revolution into its hands. In it, "plain working men
[and women] for the first time dared to infringe upon the Governmental
privilege of their 'natural
superiors' [in Jefferson's
terms, those who
thought themselves born "booted and spurred" to ride the masses] and,
under circumstances of unexamined difficulty, performed their work modestly, conscientiously, and efficiently ... " (in Marx 1978, p. 636).
In Marx's mind, the Commune-which
was more advanced than the
communes that developed in the Middle Ages and was in part inspired by
the first French Commune of 1792 (which Jefferson championed)-was
the first glimpse of how democracy might work in a socialist society. It was
formed by municipal councillors who were chosen by universal suffrage
in each ward and were "responsible and revokable at short terms." The
majority were working people or their acknowledged representatives. The
Commune itself was to be "a working, not a parliamentary body, executive
and legislative at the same time" (ibid., p. 632). And (ibid., p. 633)
In a rough sketch of national organization which the Commune had no
time to develop, it states clearly that the Commune was to be the political
formof even the smallest hamlet, and that in the ruraldistricts the
standing army was to be replaced by a national militia, with an extremely
shortterm of service. The ruralcommunes of every districtwere to
administer their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the
central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies
to the National Delegation in Paris. each delegate to be at any time
revocable and bound by the mandat imperatit( formal instructions) of his
constituents. The few but important functions which still would remain
for a central government ... were to be discharged by Communal, and
therefore strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to
be broken, but, on the contrary. to be organized by the Communal
Constitution ....
The people would decide most issues directly at the commune level
and would send their direct, recallable representatives
to provincial and
national assemblies that would in turn decide those issues that could not
be handled at the local level. The legitimate functions of govemment were
to be restored to the responsible agents of society, the common people.
This system would be very different from old representative institutions,
where every three or six years it was decided "which member of the ruling
class was to misrepresent
the people in Parliament" (ibid.). Lest there be
any misunderstanding,
Marx explicitly states that "nothing could be more
foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage
by hierarchical investiture" (ibid.). Throughout history there have been a
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few other examples of direct communal rule, starting with the original
Christian communities and including the communes formed ill Republican Spain by the socialists and anarchists during the Spanish CIVil War.
The kibbutzim in Israel are perhaps the most Widelyknown and successful
example (Woodstock 1971,p. 21).
In socialist thought, democracy is thus conceived as popular democracy in which-as with Rousseau and Jefferson-the
majority rules. According to the Marxist conception of democracy, majority rule means rule
by the poorer classes (in those societies that have not ~et achieved
advanced socialism) since they are by definition the majority (see Kiss
1982, chaps. 1, 2). Some analysts go on to say that democracy is class
determined and thus does not exist if the popular classes (where there are
still classes) do not rule (ibid., pp. 11-12). But others, who followed
Lenin's ideas and were influenced by Stalin, did not see democracy as an
end in itself. It was a means of achieving social emancipation. Like the
socialist revolution, it was a means of achieving liberation (ibid., p. 122).
The revolution was to break down the machinery of class domination and
allow a dictatorship of the proletariat to rule for the working people while
the structure of the new society was developing. Such a class dictatorship
was only considered necessary until the old bourgeois state could be
replaced by the classless society, at which time the people would rule
directly as the state withered away.
According to Lenin, the vanguard party was to lead the people in the
socialist revolution and guide the state while the new society was being
constructed. But Lenin's ideas very much flowed from the Russian political culture that produced his thought. Hannah Arendt (1958) notes, for
instance, that the revolution occurred in a country with a well-established
centralized bureaucracy. Russia had a very authoritarian culture, and "it
stands to reason that if any aspect of social life can directly affect government it is the experience with authority that men [and women 1 have" (H.
Eckstein as cited in Pateman 1970, p. 12). The historic conditions in which
the first experiment in socialist rule developed influenced not only Soviet
Marxism, but-because
of the influence of the Soviet Union-the
way in
which socialist thought and praxis developed elsewhere. Commenting on
the relative lack of democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
Mihailo Markovic (1982, pp. 171-173) also notes that the political culture
included elements of "Byzantine-Oriental societies" that did little to instill
the libertarian values that foster democracy. Rather they added to the
authoritarian influences that imprinted the development of Marxism.
The first days of the Russian revolution were exciting and dynamic.
Workers' councils or soviets took control of neighborhoods and factories
in St. Petersburg, much the same way the people had formed communes
in Paris during the first days of the French Revolution of 1792 and the
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Paris Commune of 1871. Democracy was alive, direct, and vibrant. The
people themselves were exerting their rule. As the revolution raged on
and foreignpowers cut off the infant socialist state economically and sent
expeditionary forces to overthrow it, conditions were considered to be
suchthat more authoritarian measures were needed. Democracy became
restricted as the people ruled less and less directly. Lenin, however,
believed that democracy could be reinstituted after the revolution was no
longer threatened (Medvedev 1975, p. 43). He held that if "during the
transition period from capitalism to socialism there are some restrictions
on democracy (and the extent of these restrictions must be gradually
reduced), nonetheless with the full victory of socialism all restrictions on
politicaldemocracy fall away" (in ibid., p. 31). Indeed, Lenin said, "The
victory of socialism is impossible without the realization of democracy"
(ibid.).
But for Lenin the structure and the vanguard role of the party were
fundamental. In the 1920s there was considerable discussion of how the
party would be organized and exactly what relation it would have to the
exerciseofpower by other segments of the society. Before he died in 1924,
Leninhad already begun to express concern about the role ofbureaucracy.
In this context, the question of party organization was central, but by then
what had come to be called democratic centralism had been accepted.
Ironically,although designed to democratize the functioning ofthe party,
in reality it did not allow any real discussion of the issues or contact with
the revolutionary movement as manifest in the toiling masses (Megill
1970, p. 43).
After Lenin's death there was even less opportunity for discussion.
As Stalin consolidated his power, he came to view any opposition as a
hostilebourgeois influence that had to be resisted (Medvedev 1975,p. 44).
Thus not only was popular democracy discouraged, but dissent was not
tolerated. The heady democracy of the first days of the revolution was
increasinglyreplaced by bureaucratic authoritarian party rule. The Left
oppositiontried to resist these trends inside the Soviet Union. They were
not successfuland, like Leon Trotsky, many were killed.
Although many other socialists objected to Stalinism, they did not
objecltothe "paternalistic justification of systematic antidemocratic measuresofsome form" (Cunningham 1987, p. 274). Lenin believed that the
CommunistParty was best equipped to know the general willof the people
and rule on their behalf. Stalin evidently came to believe that he was best
suited to decide important issues in the party. Thus a party bureaucracy
that was increasingly dominated by one person began to rule in the name
of the people. These decisions were ostensibly made to safeguard if not
save the revolution from its internal and external enemies. Practical
necessitywas cited as the rationale. In theoretical terms, it was argued that
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certain tactical decisions were necessary but that their implementation and
effectwere temporal. Megill(1970, p. 62) holds that the effects wer~ much
more far-reaching: they led to a theoretical failure of Stalinism that in tum
crippled the democratic Marxist tradition because it failed to ".distinguish
between purely tactical considerations-practical
considerations, which
may be more or less correct at a given moment-and the theoretical
development of Marxism."
..
The Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukacs is equally clear on this issue:
"In other words: instead of following the true method of Marxism and
developing a strategy and tactics from an analysis of events, tactical
decisions-right or wrongdecisions-were decisive,and a theory was built
on these" (cited in ibid.,p. 62). Lukacs further argues (ibid., p. 55) that
The tremendous

historical guilt of Stalinism

exists in the fact that not only

was scientific development not followed up. but this development went
backwards. Stalin hindered just those tendencies
capable of developing Marxism.

which would have been

As Marxist theory and practice developed in the Soviet Union and
those areas of the world that were modeled after it, its democratic and
participatory dimensions were generally neglected if not directly subordinated to immediate concerns as defined by the party leadership. In the
West, representative democratic institutions became bulwarks against
direct and majority participation in government, which in tum laid the
basisfor the transformation of these institutions into paternalistic organs
of minority rule (Cunningham 1987, P- 276). In socialist countries similar
processes occurred (ibid., p. 356). The paternalistic vanguardism of the
party was substituted for the direct rule of the people that Marx glimpsed
in the Paris Commune. Although party congresses and even elections were
held in the peoples' democracies, the demos was ruled much more than it
ruled. Milovan Djilas (1957, 1962) has suggested that a "new class" of
rulers had developed in such societies and that they had usurped popular
rule. The state did not wither away and democracy did not develop. Stalin
even argued that the state must be strengthened greatly before it could
wither away (Bottomore et al. 1983, p. 463). Elaborate rationalizations
attempted to show how the people were actually being served because the
party was decid~g on their behalf by setting the agenda and limiting the
number of candidates for whom the people voted in elections." As had
been done by Dahl and other revisionist theorists of democracy in the
~est, ~heory was elaborated to explain how (some) democracy actually
did exist in the status quo, even though that reality was lacking when it
came to real democracy and democratization. In both instances it seemed
it wasmuch easier to change, modify, or reinterpret the theory than it was
to change the status quo and actually allow the people to have power.
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Many who wrote from a Marxist perspective did not realize that there
wasa confluence of interests and perspective on the part ofthe hierarchies
of both Eastern socialism and Western capitalist democracy. They were
both heavilyinvested in the status quo and reluctant to allowany change.
As with the bureaucratization of the state and party in Eastern Europe,
several scholars have noted that there has been an historical proliferation
of bureaucracy and bureaucratic thought in U.S. institutions. Decisions
and initiatives for problem solving have come more and more from the
center, thus discouraging local participation (see, inter alia, Wiebe 1967,
Higgs1987,and Lasch 1919, 1991).The elite in Eastern Europe criticized
the economic and political marginalization of the majority in capitalist
democracy but would not institute genuinely democratic institutions at
home. The establishment in the West would criticize the elitist rule in
socialiststateswhile allowing economicand political elites to exerciseincreasinglymorepower at home and the massesto participate lessandless. Neither
moved to increase democracy. Both argued that the people were better
off in their respective system and insisted theirs was the model to copy.
Despite the poverty of democratic examples in both the capitalist
West and socialist East, Nicaragua had set about the process of constructingreal democracy within a socialist state. The Sandinista revolution had
rediscoveredNicaragua's popular history and thus its popular consciousness; it had indeed unleashed the power of the masses. Unlike other
revolutionary experiences, there was enough understanding among the
Sandinistas, members
of the popular church, Nicaraguan and
internationalist youth, and others involved with the revolutionary process
to set up institutional structures that included and channeled mass participation. The masses had not only been mobilized, they had found ways
they couldcontinue to express their will. But the reality wascomplex. On
the one hand the Sandinista leadership was delighted to see "the people"
(whichwashow they conceived the diverse, multiclass popular revolutionary force in Nicaragua) fully mobilized. On the other hand they feared
that if they immediately held elections, the formal Western facade of
institutional democracy that Somoza and many other traditional Central
Americanleaders had manipulated to foreclose real and effective participation might well be the only democracy that would be allowed to
develop. The Sandinista leaders were also well acquainted with Leninist
thinkingas to the vanguard role of the party and thus felt theyhad a special
obligationto prepare the people by ensuring that their politicalconsciousness was developed. The dominant role the party had assumed in the
decisionmaking process in Cuba also helped to incline their thinking in
more authoritarian directions. Because they also feared the influence of
bourgeoiselements inside the country, and in part because they could not
totallybreak away from unconscious authoritarian beliefs (which resulted
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principally from Nicaraguan political history and culture), the Sandinista
leadership, as principally manifested in the National Directorate, reserved
a substantial amount of power to itself.
In the early 1980s,the creation of West em representative institutions
was postponed and direct participation was encouraged. But an authontarian decisionmaking trend was developing inside the party and among
those Sandinista leaders who held key governmental posts. These tendencies and the increasing military and economic pressure exerted by the
United States worked against the further empowerment of the demos
through direct and continued participation. Nor were traditional models
of democracy in Eastern Europe or the West helpful in this regard.
Subsequent chapters will show how these factors interacted to produce a
unique development of democracy within a socialist state. Like the mixed
economy in which it developed, both representative and participatory
democracy eventually operated side by side under the guidance of the
democratic centralism of the FSLN. Indeed, it seems that there was
continued competition among Western representative democracy, participatory democracy, and democratic centralism. It remains to be seen if the
confluence of these factors actually caused democracy to flower in
Sandinista Nicaragua, or if it stifled the construction of what might have
been the first full-blown example of direct, participatory Marxist democracy.
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This definition includes peaceful competition for all effective positions in
government through elections, independent political participation, and a high
level of civil and political liberty as necessary conditions for democracy. It does

not seem to require that all the people be involved (directly or indirectly) in the
actual governmental process, or that decisions in government be representative
of majority interests or even majority opinion. Some might even observe, cynically,
that such a definition could classify as democratic a system in which the majority
of those eligible to vote do not vote for their national leaders and in which many
decisions seem increasingly to favor the interests of the wealthy and powerful over
the poor and powerless: that is, a system that appears to have a representative
democratic form but lacks actual democratic content and is no longer run by or

for the majority of the people.
8. Writing to Madison in 1787, Jefferson observed: "I hold it, that a little
rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary

in the political world as

storms in the physical" (in Padover 1939,p. 19). Writing to William Smith that
same year: "God forbid we should ever be twenty years without such a rebellion"

(ibid.,p. 20).
9. It should be noted, however, that in Switzerland the franchise was limited
to males until 1971 and that this decision was resisted in Apenzell. Apenzell is a
relic of one of the few successful peasant revolts (1408) in which the masses were
able to rid themselves of their overlords.

10.Pateman's (1970, p. 7) assessment of B. R. Berelson.
11.In "Two Faces of Power" (1962),Bachrach and Baratz demonstrated how
this form of democracy does not even include each group's representatives in the

agenda-setting process and may only consult them on nonessential issues. See also
Bachrach (1967).
12. Given the continual low voter turnout through the 1980s in the United
States, it remains to be seen if even this minimalist

been met. See William Greider,
American Democracy (1992).

definition of democracy has

Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of

13. Interestingly, Gurr does not address the decline in electoral participation;
nor do other authors in the special section of PS, "America as a Model for the

World" (December 1991).
14. Ironically, Bachrach and Baratz argue that the elite in the United States
uses similar tactics by limiting the range of choices that people actually have. See

Bachrach and Baratz (1962, pp. 947-952).

